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What should we expect of ‘Erasmus generations’? 
 
Abstract 
The Erasmus programme promotes student mobility within the European Union largely on 
the assumption that mobile students will become more pro-European. This article presents the 
results of a panel study of Erasmus students which suggest that, while former Erasmus 
students may be more pro-European than their peers, this is because students who choose to 
take part are already more pro-European. The attitudes to Europe and voting preferences of 
Erasmus students do not seem to diverge from their non-mobile peers while they are abroad. 
Although the programme may have other benefits, expecting it to create Europhile ‘Erasmus 
generations’ seems unrealistic.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Introduction 
The European Union’s Erasmus programme represents a significant Union-level intervention 
into European higher education systems1. Since 1987 over a million European students have 
received financial support from the European Commission to spend part of their courses 
studying in a European country other than the country in which their ‘home’ institution is 
based. In most cases this means that students who normally study in their home countries 
                                                            
1 While higher-education institutions of all EU member-states participate in Erasmus, the programme also 
includes colleges and universities in the European Economic Area and Turkey (EACEA 2009). There are related 
higher education mobility programmes involving links between EU countries and other neighbouring states 
and even, in Erasmus Mundus, funds to enable highly-qualified citizens of any country in the world to study at 
European universities.   
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receive funding to go abroad2 and assurances that courses they complete there will contribute 
to a degree from their home universities. Erasmus has become one of the most high-visibility 
EU programmes and has become iconic for Euro-enthusiasts, whose use of the term 
“Erasmus generation” to describe young Europeans (e.g. Figel 2007: 6, Kuneva 2007: 3) 
invokes a hope that European youth will prove more supportive of European integration than 
their parents or grandparents have been. The Erasmus generation, it is suggested, is made up 
of young people who have enjoyed the practical benefits of European integration, are highly 
mobile, think of themselves as European citizens, and consequently are a base of support for 
further European integration. Foremost among these are the alumni of the programme which 
gives the generation its name, former Erasmus students. 
It does seem to be true that younger citizens of European member-states, and students in 
particular, tend to be more likely to think of themselves as European (Eurobarometer 2008: 
34, Hix 1999: 147). Students who have taken part in Erasmus tend to be particularly pro-
European (ESN 2007). However, it does not follow that Erasmus is responsible. If Erasmus 
leads to pro-European views we would expect not only that former Erasmus students will be 
more pro-European than their non-Erasmus counterparts, but also that there would be an 
observable change in their attitudes while they were abroad. The alternative possibility is that 
Erasmus students are more pro-European simply because more pro-European students choose 
to take part. 
If Erasmus affects the attitudes of Erasmus students themselves, this impact may also 
diffuse through their social networks, spreading its influence beyond the students directly 
involved. However, it is difficult to imagine that the programme could have such secondary 
                                                            
2 A surprisingly large number of students who are already studying in a foreign country are ‘re-exported’ to a 
third country, or even take advantage of the support to attend universities in their home countries. 
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effects without first affecting Erasmus students. Any impact would surely be most intense for 
the iconic individuals who actually choose to immerse themselves in another European 
culture through European-Commission-sponsored study abroad.  
    Knowing whether this assumption is correct is important for both policymaking and 
theory-testing. Erasmus has been held up as a means of building support for the European 
Union among member-states’ citizens. Whether or not the programme is demonstrably 
building support for the Union among current students, some of whom will presumably go on 
to become future European elites, is important information for policymakers. Like every 
other government programme, Erasmus has opportunity costs both in money and in the 
talents and attention of its administrators, which could be employed elsewhere. Self-
evidently, Erasmus serves multiple ends. As well as possibly building support for the 
European project among Europe’s citizens, for example, it may contribute to the learning of 
European languages and make its alumni more mobile, competitive workers in the future. 
Which of these objectives is seen as the most achievable may well have implications for how 
the programme’s resources are targeted. But understanding Erasmus also has broader 
importance because it is an ideal test case for educational socialisation. If Erasmus can build 
support for the European Union this strengthens the case that being partly educated in a 
foreign country can build support for more positive international relations. Promoting student 
mobility more generally could be a means to build international solidarity. European 
integration is an example, albeit a particularly advanced one, of more intimate international 
relations which are supposedly becoming more common as a result of globalisation. These 
often have significant consequences for private citizens, and public opinion in the countries 
involved may have a significant impact on how far international integration can progress. If it 
is possible to propagate support for international intercourse through schemes like Erasmus 
this may smooth the process of globalisation. 
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It should therefore come as a surprise that very few studies have been conducted which can 
reliably assess whether participating in Erasmus causes changes in attitudes to Europe on a 
political level. After establishing that a desire to build support for European integration has 
been central to the constellation of forces which have led to the creation of the Erasmus 
programme, this paper will examine theoretical models which specify how Erasmus might 
affect students’ attitudes to Europe. I then go on to demonstrate that the existing literature on 
Erasmus does not deal with the issue satisfactorily. Previous studies either neglect the 
potential impact on students’ political attitudes or else address it in such a way that causality 
cannot be established. As existing studies do not adequately address the question, I will 
present evidence from a new panel study of Erasmus students which suggests, perhaps 
surprisingly, that the net impact of exchange experiences on the students is minimal. 
 
What is Erasmus for? 
One of the difficulties of evaluating the Erasmus programme is that its declared objectives 
have changed repeatedly throughout its history. It is tempting to assume when evaluating a 
programme that it is successful if it effectively fulfils its declared objectives. Unfortunately, 
this assumption can be highly problematic, as objectives often emerge from a rather chaotic 
environment which Kingdon (1984: Ch6) memorably labels the “policy primordial soup”. 
Before a particular policy is decided, many ideas are available, often championed by 
particular people who have become attached to them. In order for ideas such as supporting 
student mobility within the EU to become programmes, coalitions have to be formed in 
support of them. The members of these coalitions may have different objectives but want to 
do the same things to achieve them. Some might wish to increase political support for the 
European Union while others may wish to improve the employability of European graduates. 
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Creating a student mobility programme may seem to serve both of these ends, even if they 
may point in slightly different directions when it comes to the detail of how the programme 
should be designed. The programmes which eventually emerge from the policymaking 
process may well be a product of compromises between the members of the coalition, leading 
to a certain vagueness about what the programme is actually for. Similarly, while the 
programme is operating this coalition still needs to be maintained or expanded in order for it 
to survive. This may lead to changes in the programme’s declared objectives throughout its 
life, even when it continues to do very similar things. 
    Regardless of whether Kingdon’s model of the policymaking process is generalisable, it 
certainly seems to fit the creation of the Erasmus programme rather well. Over the years 
Erasmus has been presented as a means to a great variety of ends, which causes some 
confusion as to what criteria should be used to evaluate the programme (Sigalas 2006: 7-10). 
Based on a review of official publications on the subject, Papatsiba (2005) has identified four 
fundamental justifications for Commission support for Erasmus. Erasmus has been presented 
as a means to “create a European consciousness” (Papatsiba 2005: 174), to help alumni 
transcend intra-European borders during their future careers (lubricating the common 
European labour market), to allow the transfer of skills, techniques and technology within 
Europe (dynamising the economy), and to help students to acquire such personal 
characteristics as independence and intercultural sensitivity, as well as improving their 
language skills. While building support for the Europe-building project among European 
citizens is a recurring theme, simply reading official documents would suggest not only that 
that this is only one of several objectives the programme, but that it is a secondary objective. 
The economic case for Erasmus has tended to be given most weight in official mission 
statements (Papatsiba 2005: 177, 184).    
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    Recent work on the history of Erasmus, however, indicates that building popular support 
for the EU, largely by generating pro-European graduates, has in fact been central to the 
Erasmus project (Corbett 2003, 2005, Férnandez 2005, Papatsiba 2005, Sigalas 2006, 2008). 
Education is a particularly good example of a policy area in which many officials within the 
European Commission, who have had ideas which might contribute to European integration, 
have faced pressure to downplay their Europe-building agendas. Because there is not a strong 
foundation of public attachment to the European Union (Arts and Halman 2005/6), 
policymakers cannot rely on public support for such ideas. There are therefore incentives for 
sponsors of any policy which might be seen as a means of drawing power from national 
governments to the central EU institutions to minimise their visibility and therefore the 
potential for conflict (Scharpf 1999: 23-4). Education has always been a particularly sensitive 
area in this respect, with national governments historically jealous of their monopoly on 
education policy and any perception that young citizens were to be steered in a pro-European 
direction controversial (Corbett 2005). A sensible Commission official faced with these 
circumstances might well believe that a policy intended to build the European Union’s fragile 
base of public support through education would have difficulty finding support. The path of 
least resistance might be to pursue the policy but to emphasise a less-controversial objective. 
The Erasmus programme was the product of a team effort and some members genuinely do 
seem to have considered the political benefits to be of secondary importance, but for others 
they were central.  
     Corbett (2003, 2005) identifies three figures within the European Commission who played 
particularly central roles in expanding existing (relatively trivial) exchange support schemes 
into Erasmus in 1987. Peter Sutherland was the Commissioner responsible, but education was 
only a small part of his remit and he was willing to leave development to his subordinate, 
Hywel Ceri Jones, who introduced him to an already fairly developed proposal on his arrival 
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in post. Jones himself had worked in education through the release of the Janne, Tindemans 
and Adonnino Reports, all of which had emphasised the need to make Europeans more 
attached to the EU (Janne 1973, Tindemans 1975, Adonnino 1985). He himself seems to have 
been attracted less to Erasmus’ socialising role than to its educational or economic potential 
(Corbett 2003: 323, 2005: Ch8). On the other hand, Michel Richonnier, who guided Erasmus 
through Sutherland’s cabinet and was responsible for dramatically scaling up an originally 
cautious proposal, was a notable exponent of its Europe-building potential. In his thinking: 
      [A] mentality of cooperation can and must be encouraged in particular among 
Europeans before they have completed their studies [...] a higher level of mobility 
among the 6mn students at 3,600 institutions must be regarded as a crucial 
development in policies of ensuring the economic and social development if [sic] the 
community as a whole (Richonnier, cited in Corbett 2005: 131) 
    These officials had already laid the basic plans for Erasmus by 1985, but they were willing 
to take advantage of convenient events. The European Court of Justice ruling in Gravier v.s. 
City of Liège (European Court of Justice 1985) was such an opportunity. Before 1985 
member states had been obliged to allow other members’ nationals vocational training on the 
grounds that this was a component of the common labour market. The Gravier ruling 
expanded the definition of ‘vocational’ to include essentially all education which gave 
students a career advantage (Adia 1998 Ch4, Cheiladaki-Liarokapi 2007: 18-20, Sprokkereef 
1995: 341-3). To take advantage of this, Erasmus was sold to member states as a means of 
channelling students away from uncontrolled migration and into formal exchanges – even 
though the programme had been in development for years. Consequently, the employability 
and economic objectives were given greater weight (Corbett 2003: 325, 328). 
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     Thus, while some of Erasmus’ sponsors did see it primarily as a means to economic and 
educational ends, their importance may have been overstated for political convenience. Given 
that the Erasmus programme, like many other policies emanating from complex institutions 
such as the European Union, was designed by a coalition of actors with varying priorities, it 
should not come as a surprise that it has been claimed to serve multiple functions. It does not 
mean that the aim of creating pro-European citizens was not central. It is widely accepted that 
building support for the EU is central to the Erasmus programme’s objectives (Férnandez 
2005) and it has been an important driver of European involvement in education more 
generally (Corbett 2005). Whether Erasmus achieves this objective may not be the only 
possible definition of success, but it is one of several grounds on which the programme can 
legitimately be evaluated. 
 
Theoretical Expectations 
If Erasmus is a mobility programme with a political agenda – to build support for the 
European Union – this begs the question of how it might achieve this.  
    The classic approach to studying the political consequences of student mobility tests some 
version of the assumption distilled by Allport (1958) and Amir (1969) into the contact 
hypothesis. At its simplest this suggests that when people from one social group (the in-
group) are brought into extended personal contact with members of another group (the out-
group), under appropriate conditions, their attitudes toward the other group tend to improve. 
There is an extensive psychological literature on the effects of personally moving across 
international borders on attitudes to other countries and their nationals which greatly 
complicates this basic hypothesis. While some researchers have found experimental support 
for the hypothesis, others have found that the impact is minimal or even harmful. A long list 
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of caveats has been proposed to the basic hypothesis, suggesting a bewildering variety of 
circumstances in which the hypothesis cannot be expected to hold (Lee, Farrell and Link 
2004: 40-1). It is not safe to assume that any given exchange programme, including Erasmus, 
will enhance international understanding. 
    Furthermore, the Erasmus programme differs from most exchange schemes in that its 
‘political’ objective is not to improve relations between in-groups and out-groups but to build 
support for an institution external to the process. The European Commission does not fund 
French students to study in Britain in order to improve their attitudes to Britain, but to 
improve their attitudes to Europe. The European Union is a supranational institution, and 
“European” is an identity which includes both the in-group (France) and the out-group 
(Britain) as well as many other identity groups. This pattern of building support for an 
overarching institution and identity, in which several existing groups share a stake, has much 
less in common with projects to diminish international tension than it does with the process 
of state-formation. There have been many historical examples of one state emerging from a 
fusion of smaller existing communities: the modern United Kingdom from Scotland, 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland, modern Canada from English- and French-speaking 
communities, modern Germany from Prussia, Bavaria, etc. In order to survive, the new 
entities had to obtain at least some level of support from members of their populations. This 
does not necessarily mean that Erasmus is intended to create loyalty intense enough to be 
called “European supernationalism”, in Galtung’s (1994) memorable phrase, but the creation 
of support for a political entity which encapsulates students’ existing national government 
along with many others is analogous. 
    In the European context, the lack of popular support for the Union has been the subject of 
much discussion (Arts and Halman 2005/6, Scharpf 1999: Ch1). Hix (1999: 38) argues that 
David Easton’s (1975) concept of diffuse support is particularly relevant. Easton 
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distinguished “diffuse” support from a more self-interested support rooted in the perception 
that the respondent (or a group with which the respondent identifies) benefits from the 
institution. Diffuse support is rooted in an attachment to an institution which means 
individuals will sometimes subordinate their own self-interest for the good of the institution. 
Taking an extreme example, democrats accept the elections of governments they oppose and 
do not try to remove them by extra-constitutional means because of diffuse support for the 
institution. Diffuse support is crucial because it should encourage citizens to support 
integration which benefits Europe as a whole even if it is not compatible with individual 
member-state interests.  
     There is some division in the literature on how far supranational authorities can 
realistically expect to acquire diffuse support. Deutsch et al (1957) claim that supranational 
integration can be brought about, and that international mobility, particularly of students, is a 
very important causal factor associated with it. On previous occasions when existing political 
units have merged into larger communities the process has involved mobility between their 
populations. Others (e.g. Connor 1972) are more sceptical that mobility contributes 
significantly to integration. In the context of European integration, Cederman (2001) accepts 
in principle that loyalties can be shifted, through, for example, mass education, but doubts 
that Europe can secure them. Member states simply have so much control over the 
institutions which fix citizens’ loyalties that Europeanising activities (which implicitly seem 
to include Erasmus) are unlikely to have a comparable impact (Cederman 2001: 158, 162-3).   
    These ideas of “specific” and “diffuse” support are loosely paralleled by Scharpf’s (1999) 
distinction between “thin” and “thick” legitimacy. Scharpf, however, emphasises the 
possibility of securing support for the EU even if citizens do not identify themselves as 
Europeans. He identifies the EU’s lack of “thick” legitimacy (analogous to “diffuse support”) 
as an impediment to certain forms of integration, but argues that “thin” legitimacy is still 
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worth pursuing. Even if people do not feel European, they may still support European 
integration because they think it will provide benefits to people or institutions with which 
they do identify: for example, their countries or themselves. 
    It is possible that Erasmus students come to identify themselves as Europeans or become 
emotionally attached to Europe, but they may also develop a more calculated belief that 
European integration makes life better. Erasmus students experience a situation in which the 
EU’s existence enables them to study in another member state far more easily than they 
otherwise could, and the Commission also provides them with a personal subsidy. This 
experience of Erasmus could enhance pro-European sentiment without making students feel 
European simply by exposing them to the benefits of integration. However, if the Union can 
build only “thin” legitimacy this should lead to support for integration only where it appears 
compatible with the interests of member states. While an institution possessing “thick” 
legitimacy or “diffuse” support could be more aggressive in pursuing collective interests, a 
Union based on “thin” legitimacy would need to be far more careful to respect the perceived 
interests of member states which enjoy more profound popular support. 
     It is possible but by no means certain that Erasmus may generate either specific or diffuse 
support, and we need evidence on whether Erasmus students develop both.  
 
Existing Evidence 
It is therefore somewhat disappointing that the existing literature on Erasmus provides limited 
information about the extent to which participation in the programme influences political 
values and behaviour. While the review of previous work presented here focuses on studies 
specifically of Erasmus, similar points could be made about the literature on the political 
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impact of student mobility more generally. There are many excellent discussions of how 
Erasmus influences the personal development of students who take part in it (e.g. Murphy-
Lejeune 2002). However, these findings do not reflect a concern with the political impact of 
Erasmus in keeping with the supranationalist, Union-building agenda of (some of) the 
programme’s founders. In order to address this, studies need to directly target the political 
attitudes and behaviours of Erasmus students. The evidence also needs to move beyond the 
merely anecdotal, as we already know with some certainty that living abroad sometimes 
changes attitudes, for better or for worse. It is important to find out whether the numbers 
moving in one direction cancel out those moving in the other, resulting in no net change. 
Only studies based on systematic sampling can really help us address this question.    
   Of the (relatively few) studies which do draw large samples, most rely on retrospective 
research designs. These come in two forms, both of which are inherently problematic. One 
possibility is to compare former Erasmus students with the general population (e.g. ESN 
2007). We already know that exchange participants are self-selecting and tend to be relatively 
cosmopolitan before the exchange (Murphy-Lejeune 2002) and so simply discovering that 
they have unusual characteristics afterwards is hardly surprising or newsworthy (Demetry 
and Vaz 2002). Other studies rely on asking former Erasmus students whether, in retrospect, 
they think their views changed (Teichler and Maiworm 1997: 129-31). This may initially 
seem a more plausible approach, but in fact there is good reason to doubt the methodological 
reliability of retrospective designs in general (Bochner 1981: 18). Lamare’s (1975) review of 
educational socialisation studies draws a distinction between those based on asking students 
whether in retrospect they felt a given experience had influenced them and studies which 
attempted to measure attitudes before and after. The former are shown to be much more 
likely to indicate that experiences are influential than ‘before and after’ designs; students are 
quite likely to label an experience as influential even when panel studies suggest it is not. 
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    There are good grounds for believing that panel studies in which students are asked the 
same questions before and after their time abroad provide more reliable evidence. Firstly, 
respondents’ recall of their own opinions in the past may be poor. Expecting them to 
remember such complex information as the details of their own opinions may be 
unreasonable, particularly since attitude formation can result from the accumulation of subtle, 
unremarkable experiences. Secondly, when the issue is presented to respondents in 
association with the exchange their more general feelings about the exchange may interfere 
with their judgment. Retrospective studies cannot avoid this association because they are 
necessarily asking about change during a period in which the exchange almost certainly 
dominated respondents’ lives. Thirdly, respondents have a well-known psychological, 
possibly subconscious, tendency to present themselves as more intelligent and informed than 
they really are because they perceive these qualities as socially desirable (Converse 1964, De 
Vaus 2002: 108, 130). How this affects results is likely to vary according to the types of 
questions posed. Where the questions are about basic values, social desirability editing might 
lead them to over-emphasise the consistency of their values over time. However, it is also 
possible that respondents might wish to be seen as aware of and sensitive to their 
surroundings, and exaggerate attitude changes that would be expected of an intelligent visitor. 
With panel studies it is far less likely that they would be able to do so without some 
conscious effort as this would involve remembering the answers given to questions at the 
beginning of the exchange, over a year earlier. 
       A final consideration is that we need to distinguish between developments which are due 
solely to Erasmus and the impact of simply being a student. Higher education may well 
influence political development regardless of whether it occurs in a students’ home country 
or abroad (Carlson and Widaman 1988: 3, Jacobsen 2001, Mariani and Hewitt 2008). We can 
only consider Erasmus an effective intervention if it leads to a change relative to students 
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who remained in their home countries. The obvious way to facilitate such a comparison is to 
recruit a control group of non-Erasmus students and include them in a panel study along with 
the Erasmus students.  
   For the methodological argument presented here to be true, of course, the study has to be a 
genuine panel study, comparing the same people before and after. One of the larger studies of 
how Erasmus affects students (King and Ruiz-Gelices 2003) is actually an ingenious attempt 
to simulate a panel study, rather than a genuine panel, and as a result we cannot be sure it is 
not vulnerable to the problems described. This study questioned a group of graduates who 
had taken part in the Erasmus programme and then compared their responses with a group of 
pre-exchange students (who were used as surrogates for younger versions of post-exchange 
alumni) and non-Erasmus alumni who were used as controls. They infer the impact of 
Erasmus from the fact that the views of graduates who took part in Erasmus in the late 1980s 
and 1990s differed from both students about to depart in the early 2000s and alumni who 
actually did go abroad many years earlier. This technique has obvious weaknesses in 
addressing the question of political change given the myriad of uncontrolled cohort 
differences between the generations. For example, the views of British graduates from the 
1990s are likely to have been shaped by experiences common to their generation, such as 
memories of Thatcherism and the Cold War, of which later generations would have little 
recollection. Simply being much older, on average, may also affect priorities in life. It 
appears that the use of non-equivalent3 but contemporary control groups is unavoidable. 
    Emmanuel Sigalas’ (2008) study of Erasmus’ impact on European identity is, to the best of 
my knowledge, the only existing study on this subject which comes close to a controlled 
                                                            
3 Due to ethical constraints researchers could never force some students who would otherwise go abroad to 
remain in their home country as controls, even if this were methodologically more satisfactory. 
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panel design. As such it represents a significant advance on previous literature. This study 
questioned three subgroups of students (Erasmus students visiting the UK, British Erasmus 
students going abroad, and British students remaining in the UK) on their sense of being 
European. Sigalas included measures of self-identification as a European citizen, pride in 
Europe, attachment to Europe, trust in other Europeans, closeness to Europeans, whether the 
respondent believed the current level of European integration was appropriate, and feelings of 
having “things in common with other Europeans”. He found no evidence that any group 
became more supportive of further European integration, and Erasmus students who came to 
the UK actually became less proud of being European. The British students who went abroad 
did show greater attachment to Europe, contentment with British membership of the EU and 
more positive attitudes to other Europeans, but confusingly some of these changes were 
echoed by the control group for no obvious reason (Sigalas 2008: 188-90)4. Unfortunately, 
Sigalas had to distribute many of the first-wave questionnaires when Erasmus students had 
already arrived in the host country in September or October. By this time they might already 
have had important socialising experiences and would almost certainly have spent part of 
their summer educating themselves about circumstances in the host country, which might 
well have influenced their pretest responses. Many of the second-wave questionnaires were 
completed immediately when the students returned (Sigalas 2008: 140-2). Students’ attitudes 
are believed to be particularly likely to fluctuate erratically immediately after the returning 
from abroad (Klineberg 1981: 125, Useem and Useem 1967), so distributing surveys so soon 
                                                            
4 It is difficult to know if some of these were familywise errors. Each statistical test conducted has a fixed 
probability of generating a type I error, or suggesting there is a significant relationship when in reality there is 
not. Setting p=.05 as the significance threshold, for example, means there is a one-in-twenty chance of a type I 
error for every test. If the analyst then runs more than twenty tests the odds are that at least one significant 
result will be incorrectly detected. Reporting this result would be a familywise error. 
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afterwards may produce results which do not represent the longer-term settling of students’ 
attitudes. The questionnaire was also very obviously focused on Europe, possibly making 
respondents who had just returned from abroad aware of which responses would be expected. 
   Nonetheless, Sigalas’ findings obviously run counter to conventional wisdom, including the 
expectations of many of the people involved in creating the programme. This suggests that 
there is a need to examine the effect of Erasmus further. I aim to provide such an 
examination, but focus more directly on the possible impact of the Erasmus programme on 
participants’ political views and behaviour. If Erasmus study makes students more likely to 
provide political support for further integration this has important consequences for the future 
of European integration. It is also the basis of much support for the programme. Sigalas’ 
study focuses on the impact of Erasmus on students’ sense of European identity and touches 
on their views about European integration. My interest is in more overtly political questions 
which indicate how far they are likely to provide tangible support for the European project. 
 
Research Design 
I conducted a new panel study, of Erasmus students5 and a control group of non-Erasmus 
students, in the 2007-8 academic year. Both groups were asked to complete a questionnaire 
on their political views and behaviour a few months before the Erasmus students went 
abroad, and then a second, almost-identical, questionnaire a few months after the Erasmus 
students had returned. As the questionnaires were so similar, differences in the students’ 
                                                            
5 A small number of undergraduate students on Leonardo work placements during their degrees were included 
in the Erasmus group; the Leonardo programme is very similar to Erasmus for the purposes of this study. 
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responses to the two questionnaires could be taken as evidence of changes in views and 
behaviour over the course of the year.  
    The Erasmus students included were primarily students of British universities going to 
France and French university students sojourning in the UK, but smaller numbers of British 
students studying in Spain and Swedish students studying in the UK were included. These 
were matched with groups of students continuing their degrees at British, French and 
Swedish universities who acted as controls6. The research design is summarised in Figure 1. 
                                                            
6 The Erasmus students were recruited via the international offices of their universities, which agreed to 
forward standardised e-mails (in English and French as appropriate) directing the students to one of several 
versions of a survey on the Bristol Online Surveys website, each version corresponding to one subgroup of the 
sample. The British controls were recruited by a similar process through individual academic departments at 
the universities of Leeds and Reading, while the Swedish controls were contacted using a list of e-mail 
addresses provided by the University of Linköping. Due to lack of co-operation from French universities the 
French controls had to be recruited by distributing personal messages modelled on the invitation e-mails to 
randomly-selected students at a range of French universities using the Studiqg.fr social networking website.  
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Figure 1: Research Design 
 
 
    The first questionnaire was open for completion between the 8th of May and 8th of July 
2007 while the second was open between the 1st of October and 30th of November 20087. In 
practice the vast majority of responses were collected early in these windows, which 
hopefully meant most respondents had not spent too much time mentally adjusting 
themselves for life in the host country before completing the first questionnaire (which might 
have affected responses) and allowed them adequate time to settle back into their home 
countries before completing the second questionnaire.  
   As with most panel studies, there was considerable attrition between the first and second 
questionnaires: overall, only 46.9% of the Erasmus students and 54.9% of the control 
                                                            
7 The surveys for British students studying in Spain were made available slightly later in the first wave. 
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students who completed the first questionnaire provided valid responses to the second8. 
However, this still left 99 Erasmus students and 145 controls who completed both. The 
figures are summarised in Table 1.  
Table 1: Participation rates 
 
                                                            
8 I split the respondents to the first questionnaire into those who did and did not go on to complete the 
second. Chi-squared tests on the two groups’ responses confirmed that the initial views of those students who 
only completed the first questionnaire do not differ significantly from those of students who completed both. 
9 The results presented here are based on an analysis from which a few Erasmus students were removed 
because they were not nationals of the country in which they were studying. There are good theoretical 
grounds to think such students are less likely to change their views. Repeating the analysis with these students 
included does not significantly alter the findings. 
Erasmus Students 
 Number completing 2007 
questionnaire 
Number completing 2008 
questionnaire9 
Attrition (%) 
UK to France 97 56 42.3 
UK to Spain 7 3 57.1 
France to UK 81 33  59.3 
Sweden to UK 26 7 73.1 
Total 211 99 53.1 
Control Groups 
 Number completing 2007 
questionnaire 
Number completing 2008 
questionnaire 
Attrition (%) 
UK 189 113 40.2 
France 52 20 61.5 
Sweden 23 12 47.8 
Total 264 145 45.1 
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The sample is thus much smaller than those used in most nationally-representative panels and 
opinion polls, but it is fairly large compared to many similarly-designed studies in the 
literature on the political impact of international mobility – and indeed political psychology 
more generally. When the same subjects are tested repeatedly meaningful conclusions can 
often be derived from much smaller samples than would be necessary in a single-test design 
(Bergman and Magnusson 1990: 13-14, Machin et al 1997). However, it is still possible that 
particular subsets of Erasmus students who are over- or under-represented in my sample may 
react differently to the experience from others. Some caution in extrapolating from my 
sample to the broader population of Erasmus students10 is therefore warranted, and 
replication of the research on a larger scale would therefore be desirable. However the results 
presented here should give a reasonable indication of the programme’s impact. 
    There were some demographic differences between the Erasmus and control samples. 
Erasmus students were much more likely to be female, with 27 males to 60 females as 
opposed to 65 males and 70 females in the control group (each group had 3 non-responses on 
the gender question). Erasmus students were also from a narrower age range. Although the 
mean age of an Erasmus respondent was 20 and the mean control respondent 21, the vast 
majority of the Erasmus students were aged between 19 and 22 while the control sample 
contained more students who were much younger or older11. However, these differences 
should not be a cause for concern. The high proportion of women and concentration in the 
                                                            
10 In the previous academic year (2006-7, the latest for which comprehensive figures are accessible) the 
Erasmus programme supported 153,396 students from EU member-states (European Commission 2009). 
11 The respective standard deviations were 2.878 and 6.193 (for the purposes of this calculation, all 
respondents over 40 were counted as 41-year-olds). This was because the controls included 20 18-year-olds, 




20-24 age group seems to be typical of Erasmus students in general (Krzaklewska and 
Krupnik 2007: 8), while age and gender were not correlated with responses on the dependent 
variables included in this study12 
The most important independent variable in this study was obviously a dummy 
(dichotomous) variable which indicated whether the student was an Erasmus participant or a 
control. This variable was used to split the plot for analysis using the Split-Plot Analysis of 
Variance technique (SPANOVA, also known as mixed between-within ANOVA).  Split-Plot 
ANOVA divides the data into two groups and then detects convergence or divergence 
between the group means over time13. SPANOVA is used to test three hypotheses for each 
dependent variable: 
1) That there is a significant between-groups main effect. This would mean that the mean 
responses for Erasmus students were significantly different from non-Erasmus students’ 
mean responses in both 2007 and 2008. 
2) That there is a significant within-groups main effect. The within-group variable was 
time, meaning whether the individual was answering the question in the 2007 questionnaire 
or the 2008 questionnaire. A significant result would mean the mean responses of all students 
in 2008 were different from their responses in 2007. 
                                                            
12 Based on χ2 tests of gender and linear regressions of age on scores in 2008. The one exception was a slight 
significant relationship between age and being personally in favour of movement towards political union. 
13 The approach is slightly different from regression analysis using a dummy independent variable, which may 
be more familiar to political scientists. Both are implementations of the General Linear Model, and as such 
there are close conceptual links (see Cohen 1968, Field 2005: 311-2). This form of ANOVA is particularly 
suitable for a quasi-experimental scenario because it requires only categorical independent variables, in this 
case which questionnaire the responses come from and whether the respondents are Erasmus students or not.  
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3) That there is a significant interaction effect. The interaction term is crucial to this study 
because it shows whether the Erasmus students’ views changed relative to the non-Erasmus 
controls. If studying abroad were making Erasmus students more pro-European we would 
expect a significant interaction term which represented divergence in the responses of the two 
groups over the course of the year. 
    As I have demonstrated, the process of coalition-forming which led to Erasmus also led to 
a certain level of vagueness about what exactly it is expected to achieve. As well as the 
uncertainty about how far political objectives are central, there is no detailed guidance 
available about exactly what kinds of pro-European views and behaviour Erasmus may be 
expected to generate. This means that there was little guidance on what questions I should 
include as dependent variables. However, the Commission does monitor the attitudes of 
European publics in general through the Eurobarometer project, and these seem to indicate 
some of the attitude shifts which are sought in the European population as a whole. Several 
Eurobarometer questions were used in the study reported here. In addition, I included a 
question on voting intentions. The rationale for this is that changing future behaviour is 
necessary to provide material benefits to the pro-European cause; while changes in attitudes 
may be gratifying, at some point they must be converted into changes in behaviour to have an 
impact – and this conversion is by no means guaranteed. In Europe’s democratic systems the 
most obvious changes students could make in their behaviour to influence the political 
process would be to change their voting preferences. Changes in attitudes may be converted 
into political impact by many routes, including transmission to third parties who then change 
their behaviours, but direct change in Erasmus students’ voting behaviour would be 
particularly strong evidence.  
   The dependent variables for this study were derived from students’ responses to the four 
questions most relevant to Europe, placed within a larger questionnaire which was designed 
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to conceal the survey’s focus on attitudes to Europe. The first of these were two questions 
aimed at broad attitudes to Europe: one was a measure of whether subjects saw themselves as 
having primarily a European or national identity, while the second measured their level of 
attachment to Europe. Political behaviour was addressed by asking students who identified 
themselves as likely voters in a General Election how pro-European they thought their 
preferred candidate or party was. Finally, respondents were asked how far they were 
personally in favour of further European political union.  
The first dependent variable was based on responses to the question: “Do you see yourself 
as [your nationality] and not European/more [your nationality] than European/equally [your 
nationality] and European/more European than [your nationality]/European and not [your 
nationality]/don’t know”.14 This is adapted from a scale which has appeared regularly in 
Eurobarometer surveys (e.g Eurobarometer 2005: 94-8). 
The second dependent variable was based on responses to the question “How attached do 
you feel to Europe?”, to which the accepted responses were “Very attached/fairly 
attached/not very attached/not at all attached/don’t know”. Again, a very similar measure has 
appeared regularly in Eurobarometers (e.g. Eurobarometer 2005: 103-5).  
The rationale for including both of these measures was that they could potentially measure 
slightly different reactions. For example, the Erasmus experience might make some students 
more outward-looking in general, shifting their attention away from purely local identities 
toward both national and European ones. Compelling them to consider European and national 
                                                            
14 Strictly speaking all these variables are measured at an ordinal rather than interval level, and thus may not 
meet the parametric assumptions for which ANOVA is designed. The use of parametric analyses for such 
variables is, however, ubiquitous in the social sciences (Garson 2009a). Jaccard and Wang (1996: 2-4) provide 
part of the rationale for using ANOVA in such circumstances. 
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identity in opposition to each other was intended to give a measure of the relative importance 
of the two. These two questions were designed to tap “diffuse support”, which is clearly 
related to attachment.  
    The third dependent variable was whether students were likely to vote for pro- or anti-
European candidates. The question on pro-European voting preferences was not likely to be 
relevant to every respondent, because presumably some respondents would not intend to vote. 
Respondents who were not likely voters were directed not to answer the question by “piping” 
(De Vaus 2002: 125-6) in the questionnaire. It is therefore worth bearing in mind that only 
students who answered “yes” to the previous question “If there was a General Election in 
your country next week, do you think you would vote?” should have scores on this variable. 
The fact that it had 73 exchangee and 113 control respondents suggests that the vast majority 
of the sample considered themselves likely to vote. This might represent the impact of social 
desirability editing or else that students who chose to complete the survey were particularly 
likely to vote.  
Students were asked “Which party, or independent candidate, do you think you would vote 
for?” immediately before the question on whether they favoured a pro-European party, which 
is the dependent variable for which results are reported here. This was intended to separate 
the parties’ attitudes to Europe from the students’ own. The precise wording of the question 
which is the dependent variable was “Would you say this party or candidate is in favour of or 
opposed to developments towards a European political union?”. Responses to this question 
were collected on a 7-point scale: “strongly in favour/in favour/slightly in 
favour/neutral/slightly opposed/opposed/strongly opposed”. A similar question, referring to 
personal opinion rather than that of the respondent’s preferred candidate, appeared in 
Eurobarometer 64 (Eurobarometer 2006: 250). 
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For the fourth and final dependent variable, respondents were asked to rate themselves on 
an identical scale in response to the question “Are you in favour of or opposed to 
development towards a European political union?”, which was also based on the 
Eurobarometer wording. If responses to this question were to shift while reported attachment 
to Europe did not, this would imply only specific support for further integration. By allowing 
for a spectrum of opinion this variable provides much more information than simply asking 
whether respondents support their country’s membership of the Union (cf. Sigalas 2008).  
 
Results  
The tables on page 26 show the mean responses for Erasmus and non-Erasmus students on all 
four dependent variables before and after the academic year. The trend lines for the two 
groups run roughly parallel, suggesting that the two groups’ views did not diverge 
dramatically. However, we need to examine the SPANOVA diagnostic statistics to know how 
confident we can be in this interpretation.
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Table 2: Changes in the Erasmus and control students’ responses over time 
Variable Questionnaire Erasmus students' mean Erasmus Non-Erasmus students' mean No
year response (standard deviation) N response (standard deviation)
European versus national identity 2007 2.43 (.802) 2.04 (.737)
(1 = national, 5 = European) 2008 2.40 (.799) 67 2.00 (.711)
Attachment to Europe 2007 2.18 (.704) 2.66 (.811)
(1 = strongest, 4 = weakest) 2008 2.10 (.788) 88 2.63 (.815)
Likely to vote for a pro-European party 2007 2.82 (1.284) 3.33 (1.460)
(1 = most pro-EU, 7 most anti-EU) 2008 2.82 (1.368) 73 3.24 (1.447)
Favour more political union 2007 2.85 (1.369) 3.80 (1.758)
(1 = most pro-EU, 7 = most anti-EU) 2008 2.90 (1.373) 88 3.71 (1.618)
Source: Author’s own data 
















































































Source: Author’s own data. For ease of interpretation, the ‘pro-European’ position is always at the top of the scale 
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European versus national identity 
On the first variable (whether students considered their European identity more or less 
important than their nationality) there was no sign of divergence. The interaction between 
group and time showed no significant effect, with F (1, 165) = .011, p = .91515. These results 
strongly suggest there was neither divergence nor convergence between exchangees and 
controls during the study.  
   The analysis also provides information about whether the students as a whole changed over 
time. This within-subjects main effect of time was insignificant, F (1, 165) = .540, p = .463. 
On the other hand, the between-subjects main effect of group was significant at p < .001, F 
(1, 165) = 13.224 with an associated effect size (Partial Eta Squared, η2)16 of .074, a more-
than-moderate effect (Pallant 2007: 208). These results indicate that on average Erasmus 
students considered themselves considerably more European than control students did, but 
this was true from the beginning and there was no significant change in either group’s 
position after the exchange period. 
Attachment to Europe 
The second dependent variable, attachment to Europe, showed a similar pattern. The 
group/time interaction was not significant, F (1, 217) = .323, p = .570. This indicates no 
significant divergence or convergence in the two groups’ attachment to Europe during the 
year.  
                                                            
15 F ratios reported here refer to Wilks’ Lambda, one of several multivariate tests which can be used to 
calculate SPANOVA results. All of these lead to the same F ratios and significance figures. 
16 Partial Eta Squared is known to slightly overestimate the effect size in the population (Field 2005:357, 384-
5). In this case, slight overestimates are unlikely to affect any of the conclusions drawn and this measure of 
effect size is convenient when dealing with unequal sample sizes. 
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    For the main effects, the within-subjects (time) effect was also insignificant, F (1, 217) = 
1.057, sig = .305 but again there was a highly significant between-subjects effect (for group), 
F (1, 217) = 27.208, p < .001 which represented a substantial effect (η2 = .111). Again, 
exchangees were much more attached to Europe at the start of the study and remained so. 
Likely to vote for a pro-European party: 
On the measure of voting intentions there was no significant interaction between group and 
time, F (1, 184) = .188, p = .665, indicating that exchangees’ and controls’ voting preferences 
for pro- or anti-European parties did not converge or diverge.  
   The figures for the main within-subjects effect of change over time were actually identical 
to those for the interaction, F (1, 184) = .188, p = .665; again, there was no evidence of the 
average position of an Erasmus or a non-Erasmus student changing over time. The main 
effect for group was significant, F (1, 184) = 6.232, p = .013, although the effect size for 
group was relatively small, with η2 = .033. In other words, Erasmus students were a little 
more likely to favour more pro-European candidates at the beginning of my study, and this 
preference persisted after their time abroad.  
In favour of more European political union: 
Again, there was no significant interaction between being an Erasmus student (or not) and 
change over time, with F (1, 218) = .621, p = .432. There was no sign of convergence or 
divergence in attitudes to European political union during the year.  
   There was no significant main effect for time, with F (1, 218) = .069, p = .793. On the other 
hand, the main between-subjects effect yielded F (1, 218) = 19.864, p < .001 with a more-
than-moderate effect size, η2 = .084. Erasmus students seem to have been noticeably more 
favourable towards further European political union and remained more pro-European over 
the course of the study.  
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    On this dependent variable there was a notable violation of the assumption that the error 
variances of the two groups were equal, and Levene’s Test consequently returned highly 
significant results for both the first and second waves of the survey (p < .001 and p < .01, 
respectively). Equality of error variances is an important assumption of Split-Plot ANOVA. 
However, ANOVA can generally tolerate violations of this assumption provided that the 
sample sizes for the two groups are similar17, as they are in this case. Given that the p 
(significance) values for this analysis are all very far from the .05 threshold it seems safe to 
accept the general pattern of results reported above, that there was no significant change in 
either group or divergence between them, although the F values may be slightly inaccurate.    
    
   Overall, this is basically the pattern we would expect if Erasmus was having no impact. The 
significant differences in the between-subjects main effects for all dependent variables 
indicate that there were significant differences between the Erasmus and control students at 
the beginning of the study. These differences persisted. The fact that none of the interaction 
effects were significant suggests that there was no convergence or divergence between the 
two groups over the course of the study. In other words, there is no evidence that being in the 
Erasmus group, rather than the control group, affected how students’ views developed. 
 
Conclusions 
The research reported here suggests that the Erasmus experience did not cause students to 
become more pro-European. There was no evidence that Erasmus students increased either 
                                                            
17 Rough guides to how small the ratios of sample sizes need to be vary between 3:2, as reported in Pallant 
2007: 204, and 4:1, reported in Garson 2009: Assumptions. 
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their diffuse or their specific support for the European Union. There were significant 
differences between Erasmus and non-Erasmus students, and the Erasmus students tended to 
be more pro-European. However, this was just as true at the start of the study as at the end, 
and so these differences cannot be ascribed to the impact of the Erasmus programme. The 
control group used in this study was not large enough to be a probability sample of the 
overall non-Erasmus student population, but the pattern I have discovered would be 
consistent with the Erasmus students having begun with unusually pro-European views and 
maintained them during their time abroad. 
These results provide no support for the hypothesis that taking part in the Erasmus 
programme leads to revolutionary changes in students’ political views in the short term. They 
tend to suggest that if future ‘Erasmus generations’ differ from their predecessors it is 
unlikely to be as a consequence of the programme.     
     This analysis does not necessarily show that Erasmus has no political impact. Two major 
issues remain: how far it is possible to generalise from the results, and whether they reflect 
the long-term consequences of Erasmus. 
    On the issue of generalisation, it is at least possible that these findings from a sample of 
British, Swedish and French students are not representative of the broader Erasmus 
population. These three are geographically close, similarly wealthy, and students can travel 
privately between them with ease. Relatively large proportions of all three countries’ 
populations tend to eurosceptic positions – in Britain and Sweden majorities have been found 
to oppose further political integration, while even in France support is below the European 
average (Eurobarometer 2006: 250). The Erasmus countries are by definition European18, but 
                                                            
18 Debatably, in Turkey’s case 
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there are greater differences between some than others. For example, there might be greater 
impact if the students moved between Eastern and Western Europe, or between particularly 
europhile and eurosceptic countries, and it would be interesting to see the research repeated 
with samples from different nationalities. On the other hand, while it is true that this study 
has focused on students moving between countries which are relatively close and similar, 
most Erasmus students move between countries which are relatively close and similar, at 
least in popular attitudes to European integration. In 2006/7 around half of all Erasmus 
students went to just five countries, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain19. Similarly, 
around half of all Erasmus students originated from universities in five countries, in this case 
France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain20 (European Commission 2009). Apart from 
Poland, all of them are Western European countries, and these five countries have more 
similar levels of support for European political integration than do Britain, France and 
Sweden (Eurobarometer 2006: 250). The similarities between many Erasmus students’ home 
and host countries are further emphasised by the pattern of the largest student flows. 
Movements between individual pairs of countries which involved over a thousand students in 
2006/7 accounted for just under half of total Erasmus mobility that year. All but five of these 
large student flows were between Western European countries21 and all but a handful22 were 
                                                            
19  These countries received 10.4%, 13%, 11.2%, 9.3% and 17.2%, respectively, of all Erasmus students. In all 
cases the vast majority were from other EU member-states. 
20  These produced 14.4%, 15%, 10.8%, 7% and 14%, respectively, of all Erasmus students; only 4.5% of 
Erasmus students were students of British universities. Not all of these students were necessarily nationals of 
the country in which their home universities were based, but most probably would have been. 
21 Separate statistics are not kept for former East Germany, so it is included in Western Europe. 
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between two of the top five producing and receiving countries or else between countries 
which are very close neighbours, such as Spain and Portugal (European Commission 2009, 
author’s calculations). Most Erasmus students, it seems, do not move between countries 
which are much further apart in geographical distance or levels of support for European 
integration than Britain, France and Sweden.  
    There may also be a limit to how much a panel study of this kind tells us about the long 
term impact of the programme. The survey results indicate respondents’ views a few months 
after their return remained similar to their views a few months before their departure. The 
lack of observable change during this time-frame seems to make long-term change 
significantly less likely, but it is not impossible that long-term impact could occur without 
observable short-term changes. For example, it is at least conceivable that the very few 
students who develop pro-European sentiments while abroad (and who are ‘cancelled out’ in 
this study by students who become more eurosceptic) might go on to become more influential 
than their peers. Lifetime tracking of alumni would be necessary to rule this out definitively. 
However, this hypothesis has never been systematically tested – perhaps revealing that the 
Commission does not expect the impact to occur only over such a long time-frame. So little is 
known about the long-term impact of Erasmus that neither I nor the sponsors of the Erasmus 
programme can be confident of knowing how the long-term effect compares to the short-term 
impact.      
    My findings are therefore important as well as counter-intuitive. The Erasmus programme 
has been founded partly on an assumption that Erasmus students will tend to become more 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
22 The exceptions are students of Belgian institutions going to Spain, Spanish students going to Belgium and the 
Netherlands, German students going to Sweden and Finland and students of French institutions going to 
Sweden. 
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pro-European as a result of their time abroad. The best evidence available is that this 
assumption is faulty. The findings add to a growing body of evidence that international 
student mobility does not necessarily lead to support for supranational integration. 
   This analysis suggests that the hype surrounding the ‘Erasmus generation’ is unjustified, 
but it may also distract attention from other goals. There are inevitable opportunity costs to 
acting as if Erasmus is a means of directly building pro-European sentiment. One possibility 
is that the talents and resources devoted to running the scheme might be better deployed 
elsewhere. But many other reasons have been suggested for the Commission to support 
Erasmus: it may promote the learning of foreign languages and awareness of other European 
cultures, spread business or policy ideas, allow students to access specialist knowledge 
unavailable in their own countries, or offer a symbol of European cooperation. All of these 
could benefit individual Europeans and some might indirectly create support for the European 
project. If the programme is not directly creating support for the European Union among 
Erasmus students, making people aware of this may allow them to refocus attention on goods 
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